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 Wysłany: Czw 14:44, 21 Kwi 2011 Temat postu: Asymmetric information theory of security institut |
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Asymmetric information theory of security agencies operating under the mode of selection of
Summary of the national economy, SMEs play a pivotal role, the security agencies as a solution to an effective means of financing for SMEs is becoming the focus of theoretical research. In this paper, asymmetric information theory, The Nature of SME financing, and then analyzes security institutions in addressing the problem of financing the operation of the mechanism,[link widoczny dla zalogowanych], and compare different forms of loan credit guarantee institutions, and ultimately concluded that mutual guarantee institutions in China guarantee the optimal choice of organization mode of operation. Keywords information asymmetry Mutual Guarantee Agency credit rationing I. INTRODUCTION China's thesis Union editing. In market economic activities, information on various types of personnel on the understanding there is a difference. More adequate access to information officers, often in a more favorable position, and the information poor who are in a relatively disadvantageous position. Asymmetric information theory by three American economists - Joseph Stiglitz, Michael Spence 乔治阿克尔 Love and raised. The theory is that: the market is more about the seller than the buyer of goods of various information; know more the party can be a party to the transfer of information poor reliable information to benefit in the market; buyers and sellers in the party with less information will try to obtain information from the other party; market signals show a certain extent can make up for the problem of asymmetric information; information asymmetry is inherent shortcomings of the market economy system, in order to reduce the information asymmetry on the economy harm. Market system the Government should play a strong role. This theory is a lot of market phenomena such as the stock market ups and downs, employment and unemployment, credit rationing, product promotion, market share and other commodities to provide an explanation, and became the core of modern information economics, is widely used in everything from traditional agricultural markets to modern financial markets and other fields. Bottleneck restricting the development of SMEs is the problem of financing SMEs. SME financing is the key to guarantee hard. The guarantee is difficult to solve, give full play to the role of security agencies must select the appropriate conditions to guarantee system. Therefore, from the theoretical level is difficult to analyze the nature of security reasons, and then select the appropriate mode of operation is difficult to break the security of the key for SMEs. Second, asymmetric information theory of security agencies operating within the framework of the principle of (a) within the framework of asymmetric information theory because of difficulties in financing small and medium 1, Moral Hazard and Adverse Select information asymmetry can be distinguished from the content of hidden action (Hidden Actions) and hidden information (Hidden Information). The former refers to the action because the parties knew only by his own, or just by signing a contract for all people know, and outsiders can not be observed; the latter is due to uneven distribution of information, contracting party of his own knowledge (personal feature) know a lot, while others do not know or know very little, or may affect the natural state of knowledge of contract, a person knows the other people do not know. Information asymmetry from the time of asymmetric information can be divided into pre and post information asymmetry. The former refers to the contracting parties to the transaction occurred before the information asymmetry, which refers to the contracting parties to the transaction occurs after the information asymmetry. Asymmetric information in advance will cause adverse selection (AdverseSelection) problems, asymmetric information after the risk of moral hazard (Moral Hazard) issues. Adverse selection refers to the establishment of the principal - agent before the agent is unaware of certain client information, client did not know the type of agents, which are not known to the client information may be detrimental to the client. Agent seeking to harm their own interests may take the behavior of the client transactions. In this case, the market allocation is inefficient. The asymmetry of information control, Information asymmetry is the root cause adverse selection. Moral hazard refers to the agent to maximize their own utility at the expense of the effectiveness of the client or the behavior of other agents. After signing the contract, the agent aware of their actions, and the client can not be observed due to asymmetric information and an agent of action, in this case, agents do not bear the full results of their actions, or that they do not want to accept uncertainty and incomplete or bound to bring the full benefits of the contract or loss, which is not complete or stop the agent bound by contract to accept all the gain or loss. Would undermine the existence of moral hazard or lead to market equilibrium market equilibrium inefficient. 2, The Nature of SME financing - under asymmetric information theory of classical economics, in the symmetric information, perfect competition, free movement of factors of production under perfect market conditions, credit market price leverage a interest rates will adjust the credit supply and demand of funds, making the competitive balance or the credit markets, said Walras (Walars) equilibrium, while the credit markets makes the credit resources to achieve a balanced Pareto (Pareto) optimal state of the financial resources to with Pareto efficiency. However, this assumption of perfect is very difficult to achieve in the real world, but in reality is a common phenomenon in the case of asymmetric information everywhere. Course in corporate finance, capital supply and demand more of their information is configured in an asymmetrical state. Because of information asymmetry, market transactions in respect of the existence of a variety of risks. Reflected in the risk of asymmetric information, the two sides to the extent performance of asymmetric information and asymmetric information, decision-making, etc., and thus adverse selection and moral hazard, resulting in transactions to reduce or even disappear trading, market collapse, distort the allocation of resources, reduce financial market efficiency. In the bank-enterprise relationship, there is asymmetric information, this point is particularly evident on lending to SMEs. SMEs, due to various non-standard, and its operating conditions, financial status, management status, customer relationships and contractual relationship are private information for banks, bank assets is difficult under the current situation of SMEs, and past use of the loans default records information in advance to determine their risk, and after the loan is more difficult to regulate. It is because of information asymmetry, making the small and medium banks face high adverse selection and moral hazard. Excellent operating performance, repayment ability of the SMEs tend to take full account of their solvency, greater than the interest income only when the borrower is willing to borrow. On the contrary, those poor operating performance, weak corporate repayment ability but not the full account of their own solvency, as well financing companies are willing to pay a higher interest rate than the average. Therefore, the higher interest rate loans under the bank is usually the flow of high-risk enterprise. This is adverse selection in credit markets. In addition, the SMEs to obtain loans, some negative information may be withheld even provide false information; loans, due to difficult for banks to carry out effective monitoring of enterprise, the enterprise may be to invest in high-risk projects. This is the moral hazard on the credit markets. Thus, the financing needs of SMEs can not be met with two of the most important factors: first of the high risk of asymmetric information; the second is the higher transaction and management costs. Shows the harm caused by information asymmetry is severe. Compared with large enterprises, SMEs, information asymmetry problem is more frequent and more severe, and thus the potential adverse selection and moral hazard are more severe, which became an obstacle for SMEs to obtain credit from the bank funds the main obstacle
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